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I.

JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS

The Court lacks jurisdiction over this appeal as it
relates to the King defendants because of plaintiff's defective
notice of appeal.
II.

ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

(1) Whether this Court lacks jurisdiction to hear this
appeal with respect to the King defendants as a result of
plaintiff's defective notice of appeal.
(2) Whether plaintiff, despite the requirements of Rule
56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and Rule 4-501 of the Utah
Code of Judicial Administration, can dispute factual issues for
the first time on appeal and raise facts not contained in the
record on appeal.
(3) Whether the King defendants are entitled to judgment
as a result of plaintiff's failure to make a factual showing to
establish the elements of her claim for legal malpractice in the
face of defendants' motions for summary judgment.
(4) Whether the King defendants are entitled to judgment
based upon the admitted facts.
III.
A.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

NATURE OF THE CASE.
Plaintiff Helen S. Coleman ("plaintiff") commenced

this legal malpractice action against defendants in April of
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1988.

Pursuant to a stipulation of counsel, the district court

dismissed defendant Glen T. Cella from the case with prejudice.
(R. at p. 54).

In November of 1988, defendants filed motions

for summary judgment.

(R. at pp. 74 and 145).

Shortly

thereafter, plaintiff's counsel withdrew and plaintiff began
representing herself.

Because of the withdrawal of plaintiff's

counsel, the district court postponed hearing defendants' motions
until late January of 1989.

(R. at p. 155). On January 24, 1989,

the district court heard argument from plaintiff and counsel for
defendants, and then took the motions under advisement.
(Reporter's Transcript of January 24, 1989 Hearing Motion for
Summary Judgment).

On March 1, 1989, the Honorable Rodney S. Page

issued a ruling granting defendants' motions and directing
defendants to prepare findings and orders.

(R. at p. 165). On

April 3, 1989, the district court approved findings of fact and
entered judgment in favor of the Florence defendants.

(R. at

pp. 185 and 198). On April 18, 1989, the district court approved

1

This action was initially filed by Oscar Howard Coleman and
Helen S. Coleman. Plaintiff Oscar S. Coleman dismissed his claims
against defendants. (R. at p. 161). However, many of the actions
of plaintiff in this case were undertaken with Mr. Coleman, and
for ease of reference, in those situations, reference is made to
plaintiffs.
2

"Defendants" shall refer to all defendants in this case.
In some instances, a distinction is required between the
defendants. When a distinction is required, defendants Felshaw
King and King & King shall be referred to as the "King defendants"
and defendants Brian R. Florence, John Blair Hutchison and
Florence & Hutchison shall be referred to as the "Florence
defendants."
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findings of fact and entered judgment in favor of the King
defendants.

(R. at pp. 202 and 211).

On April 28, 1989,

plaintiff filed her Amended Notice of Appeal, in which she
appealed the "judgment of the Honorable Rodney S. Page entered on
the 3rd day of April, A.D., 1989-M

(R. at p. 213). On June 12,

1989, the King defendants moved to dismiss the appeal as to them
based on plaintiff's failure to appeal the order entered by the
district court on April 18, 1989. That same day, the Utah Supreme
Court transferred this matter to the Utah Court of Appeals.
B.

STATEMENT OF FACTS.3
On March 8, 1979, plaintiffs sold the property located at

354 East 200 South, Clearfield, Utah to Doyle and Goldie Logan
(the "Logans") for a total sum of $105,000.00 pursuant to a
Uniform Real Estate Contract ("Real Estate Contract").

Plaintiffs

received $25,084.65 as a down payment on the purchase.

On

August 1, 1979, the Logans sold their interest in the property to
Wayne and Kim Carlos pursuant to an Assignment of Escrow.

Wayne

and Kim Carlos assumed the $83,642.58 balance due on principal,
plus 11.5 percent interest, at $1,072.23 per month.

On June 8,

1983, Wayne and Kim Carlos were divorced and Kim Carlos was
awarded the property.

Plaintiffs were fully apprised and aware of

^The facts are all taken from the Memorandum of Points and
Authorities in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment; R. at pp.
77-85.
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the property purchase by Wayne and Kim Carlos, and of the
subsequent divorce and distribution of the property to Kim Carlos.
In March of 1984, due to a history of late payments dating
from August 1979 to March 1984, plaintiffs reached an agreement
with Kim Carlos which modified the Real Estate Contract and
Assignment of Escrow.

The agreement extended the maturity of the

debt, increased the interest rate from 11.5 percent per annum to 20
percent per annum, increased the monthly installment payments from
$1,072.23 to $1,435.00, and added late fees on all delinquent
payments of $71.00 prior to the 15th of each month and $142.00
subsequent to the 15th of each month.

The terms of the agreement

between the plaintiffs and Kim Carlos, along with a blank real
estate form, were given to a secretary at King & King by
plaintiff.

Plaintiff asked a secretary at King & King to prepare a

modification agreement by typing the terms of the agreement on the
blank form.

Pursuant to plaintiff's request, a modification

agreement was drafted by Glen Cella under the supervision of
defendant, Felshaw King.

The final draft of the Modification

Agreement did not include the Logans or Wayne Carlos as parties,
and specifically states that Kim Carlos was the only party to the
modifications, and was the only party responsible and liable for
further payments.

The Modification Agreement was signed by

plaintiffs and Kim Carlos on March 29, 1984.
From March 29, 1984 until June 1, 1986, the date when Kim
Carlos defaulted, plaintiffs received payments from Kim Carlos
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under the terms of the Modification Agreement.

Plaintiffs never

contacted Wayne Carlos or the Logans regarding any delinquent
payments under the contract and never made any demand that Wayne
Carlos or the Logans make any additional payments for the property.
On July 10, 1986, plaintiff contacted defendant, Brian R.
Florence, for legal assistance with the default of Kim Carlos. A
Verified Complaint for foreclosure was prepared and verified by
plaintiffs on August 8, 1986.

In the Verified Complaint, plaintiff

stated under oath that they agreed to substitute Kim Carlos as the
sole buyer of the property.

In the foreclosure action, on

March 11, 1987, Judge Page entered judgment for plaintiffs against
Kim Carlos for $60,497.35 in principal, interest and late fees;
which included $12,672.67 for the first and second mortgage,
$3,792.11 in delinquent property taxes, $1,664.00 for plaintiffs'
attorneys' fees, $390.00 for attorneys1 fees for First Security
Bank and $300.00 for attorneys1 fees for Bank of Utah.
On May 12, 1987, after prior discussions with plaintiffs,
Brian R. Florence bid $67,975.61, which included the sum total of
judgment plus interest, for the property at foreclosure.

This

amount was bid despite plaintiffs' continual representation to
defendant Brian R. Florence, that the property in question was
worth at least $105,000.00, the amount it was sold for in 1979.
Plaintiff was present at the foreclosure sale and did not object to
the bid that was offered by defendant, Brian R. Florence.
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VI.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Plaintiff's Amended Notice of Appeal fails to indicate
that plaintiff is appealing the judgment entered in favor of the
King defendants on April 18, 1989. The Amended Notice of Appeal
indicates that plaintiff is appealing the judgment entered on
April 3, 1989. As a result of the defective notice, this Court
lacks jurisdiction to review the judgment entered in favor of the
King defendants.
Defendants properly filed motions for summary judgment
supported by legal memoranda that recited the factual basis for the
motions.

The motions complied with the requirements of Rule 56 of

the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and Rule 4-501 of the Utah Code
of Judicial Administration.

Plaintiff failed to file or present

any evidence contradicting the facts set forth in the memoranda
supporting defendants' motions for summary judgment.

Plaintiff

cannot now ask this Court to reverse the district court based on
factual disputes not raised below or on facts that are not
contained in the record on appeal.
Based upon the admitted facts, the district court
correctly granted judgment in favor of the King defendants.
Plaintiff claims the King defendants were negligent by relieving
the Logans and Wayne Carlos from liability under the Modification
Agreement.

However, by failing to oppose defendants' motions for

summary judgment, plaintiff failed to produce any expert testimony
as to the standard of care owed by the King defendants to plaintiff
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in connection with drafting the Modification Agreement.
Plaintiff's failure in this regard is sufficient reason for entry
of judgment under Rule 56 and the cases interpreting Rule 56.
Even if plaintiff had submitted the required expert
testimony, the admitted facts show that plaintiff intended that Kim
Carlos be the sole person responsible for payments under the
Modification Agreement, and therefore, the district court properly
concluded that the King defendants were entitled to judgment.

In

addition, plaintiff offered no evidence to show that the King
defendants' alleged negligence was the proximate cause of any
damage.

The admitted facts show that even if the King defendants

were nggligent in failing to include the Logans and Wayne Carlos as
responsible parties after the Modification Agreement, that
negligence was not the proximate cause of any damage to plaintiff.
For these reasons, the district court correctly entered judgment
for the King defendants, and this Court should affirm the judgment
on appeal.
V.
A.

ARGUMENT

THIS COURT LACKS JURISDICTION TO REVIEW THE DISTRICT COURT'S
ORDER GRANTING THE KING DEFENDANTS' SUMMARY JUDGMENT BECAUSE
OF PLAINTIFF'S DEFECTIVE AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL.
Rule 3(d) of the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court requires

that a notice of appeal designate the judgment or order appealed
from.

Without a proper notice of appeal, the Court is without

jurisdiction to hear the matter.
(Utah 1981).

Yost v. State, 640 P.2d 1044

In Yost, a multiple defendant case, the Utah Supreme
-7-

Court refused to take jurisdiction of an appeal from a summary
judgment granted in favor of one co-defendant in connection with
an appeal of other portions of the case because the appeal of the
summary judgment was never perfected.

Ld. at 1047.

This Court also lacks jurisdiction over an untimely
appeal.

Burgers v. Maiben, 652 P.2d, 1320, 1322 (Utah 1982);

Bowen v. Riverton City, 656 P.2d 434, 436 (Utah 1982); and Nelson
v. Stoker, 669 P.2d 390, 392 (Utah 1983).
In this case, plaintiff's Amended Notice of Appeal does
not designate the judgment entered in favor of the King defendants
on April 18, 1989, and the time for taking such an appeal has
run.

Accordingly, plaintiff's appeal against the King defendants

should be dismissed.
B.

PLAINTIFF CANNOT DISPUTE THE FACTS SUBMITTED BY DEFENDANTS IN
SUPPORT OF THEIR MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT FOR THE FIRST
TIME ON APPEAL.
Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and Rule

4-501 of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration set forth in
detail the procedure to be followed by a party who seeks to
contradict evidence supporting a motion for summary judgment.
When the procedure is not followed, the statement of facts of the
party moving for summary judgment shall be "deemed admitted", and
summary judgment, if appropriate shall be granted.

Utah Code of

Judicial Administration, Rule 4-501(5); Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, Rule 56(e).

The deemed admission exists not only for

-8-

the district court, but also, through all reviews of the district
court's actions by appellate courts.

In Busch Corporation v.

State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 743 P.2d 1217 (Utah 1987), the
Utah Supreme Court, in reviewing an appeal from a summary
judgment, held that when an argument is not raised before the
district court, it cannot be raised on appeal.

Id. at 1219.

Quoting from an earlier opinion, the Court stated:
[W]hen a party opposes a properly supported
motion for summary judgment and fails to file any
responsive affidavits or other evidentiary
materials allowed by Rule 56(e), the trial court
may properly conclude that there are no genuine
issues of fact unless the face of the movant's
affidavit affirmatively discloses the existence
of such an issue. Without such a showing, the
Court need only decide whether, on the basis of
the applicable law, the moving party is entitled
to judgment.
Id. (citing Franklin Financial v. New Empire Development Co., 659
P.2d 1040, 1044 (Utah 1983)); see also Salt Lake City Corp. v.
James Constructors, Inc., 761 P.2d 42, 46 (Utah App. 1988).
In this case, the record on appeal clearly shows that
plaintiff failed to file an opposition to defendants' motions and
made no attempt whatsoever to contradict the facts submitted by
defendants in support of their motions. Under these
circumstances, defendants' stated facts are "deemed admitted", and
the district court and this Court are bound by the admitted
facts.

Accordingly, plaintiff's argument against the district

court's findings of fact at pp. 12-30 of Appellant's Opening Brief
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must be disregarded as they are not established from the record on
appeal and are being raised for the first time on appeal.
C.

DEFENDANTS ARE ENTITLED TO JUDGMENT BECAUSE PLAINTIFF FAILED
TO PRODUCE EVIDENCE ESTABLISHING THE ELEMENTS OF HER LEGAL
MALPRACTICE CLAIM.
Although the facts deemed admitted must be viewed in the

light most favorable to plaintiff, Atlas Corp. v. Clovis National
Bank, 737 P.2d 225, 229 (Utah 1987), this Court must affirm the
district court's judgment because plaintiff failed to make any
factual showing establishing the essential elements of her claim.
Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides for
summary judgment.

In Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,

(1986), the United States Supreme Court made the following
statement regarding the comparable Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure:
In our view, the plain language of Rule
56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment
after adequate time for discovery and upon
motion, against a party who fails to make a
showing sufficient to establish the existence of
an essential element to that party's case, and on
which that party will bear the burden of proof at
trial. In such a situation, there can be 'no
genuine issue as to any material fact,1 since a
complete failure of proof concerning an essential
element of the non-moving party's case
necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.
The moving party is 'entitled to judgment as a
matter of law' because the non-moving party has
failed to make a sufficient showing of her case
with respect to which she has the burden of proof.
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Id. at 322-23 (emphasis added).

See Robinson v. Intermountain

Health, Inc., 740 P.2d 262 (Utah App. 1987).

In other words, to

avoid judgment, plaintiff was required to raise factual issues
sufficient to establish the existence of all the elements
necessary to recover on her claim for legal malpractice.
In order to establish a case of legal malpractice,
plaintiff must prove each and every one of the following elements:
1.

an attorney/client relationship;

2.

a duty of the attorney to the client;

3.

a breach of the duty;

4.

damages suffered by the client; and

5. that the attorneys' negligence
proximately caused the damage to the client.
Williams v. Barber, 765 P.2d 887 (Utah 1988).
1.

Plaintiff Failed to Establish that the King Defendants
Breached Their Duty to Plaintiff.
In order to establish breach of duty, a plaintiff in a

legal malpractice case, like a plaintiff in a medical malpractice
case, must introduce expert testimony concerning the standard of
care.

Jennings v. Stoker, 652 P.2d 912, 914 (Utah 1982)

("[a]bsent a situation where the propriety of the treatment
received is within the common knowledge and experience of the
layman, the plaintiff in a medical malpractice case must prove the
standard of care by expert medical testimony.")

See also, Martin

v. Mott, 744 P.2d 337 (Utah App. 1987) (Court affirmed summary

-11-

judgment in favor of medical malpractice defendants when plaintiff
failed to produce competent expert testimony to show standard of
care and breach of that standard by defendants.)

In one of the

leading treatises on legal malpractice, the need for expert
testimony is explained as follows:
Whether an attorney has complied with the
standard of care is an issue of fact, unless the
evidence is so patent and conclusive that
reasonable persons can reach only one conclusion.
Thus, expert testimony is necessary to establish
the standard of care since only an attorney can
competently testify to whether the defendant
comported to the prevailing legal standard.
Without expert assistance, lay juries cannot
understand litigation issues, local practices, or
the broad spectrum of issues which influence how
an attorney should act or advise.
R. Mallen and J. Smith, LEGAL MALPRACTICE (3d ed. 1989) § 27.15,
pp. 667-68, and cases cited therein.
In this case, plaintiff claims that the King defendants
were negligent in drafting the Modification Agreement.

To

determine whether plaintiff's claim has any validity, plaintiff
would have to establish the standard of care owed to plaintiff by
the King defendants and that the King defendants breached that
duty.

The duty of care owed to a person in plaintiff's position

is not something that is within the common knowledge of the
layperson and can only be established by expert testimony.
Whether the Modification Agreement drafted by the King defendants
meets the standard of care is also an issue beyond the common
knowledge of the layperson.

In this case, plaintiff failed to
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present any expert testimony in opposition to defendants' motions
for summary judgment concerning the standard of care or concerning
breach of that standard, and by failing to do so, plaintiff failed
to establish an essential element of her case.
2.

Plaintiff Failed to Produce Any Evidence Shoving that the
King Defendants' Alleged Negligence Was the Proximate
Cause of Any Damages Suffered by Plaintiff.
Proximate cause in legal malpractice actions embodies the

concept of a case within a case. As the Utah Supreme Court noted
in Williams v. Barber, "incurring liability through a breach of
duty does not necessarily result in damages."

765 P.2d at 889.

This is because in a legal malpractice action, "proximate cause
embraces an assessment of the merits of the underlying cause of
action."

IcL; see also Dunn v. McKay, Burton, McMurray & Thurman,

584 P.2d 894, 895 (Utah 1978) (appropriate to inquire as to what
the plaintiff's position would have been if attorney had performed
the act properly); Young v. Bridwell, 437 P.2d 686, 689 (Utah
1968) (in order to make out a cause of action against an attorney
for failing to advise plaintiff of right to appeal, it would have
to be shown that there was a reasonable likelihood of reversing
the judgment and that it would have benefited plaintiff).

In

other words, before a court can determine that a plaintiff has
been damaged, there must be some evidence as to what the
plaintiff's position would have been had the attorney performed
properly.
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In this case, for plaintiff to establish the element of
proximate cause, she was required to produce some evidence showing
that the omission of the Logans and Wayne Carlos from continuing
liability after the Modification Agreement caused plaintiff
damage.

Plaintiff has produced no evidence in this regard.

There

is no evidence to show that had the Logans and Wayne Carlos been
liable for payments after the Modification Agreement that
additional payments would have been made.

There is no evidence to

show that had the Logans and Wayne Carlos been liable that
plaintiff would have received more than she did through the
foreclosure action.

Without evidence of this type, plaintiff

cannot raise any factual issues as to the proximate cause element
of her legal malpractice claim, and judgment in favor of the King
defendants must be affirmed.
D.

THE KING DEFENDANTS ARE ENTITLED TO JUDGMENT BASED ON THE
ADMITTED FACTS.
1.

The Admitted Facts Show that Plaintiff Intended Only
Kim Carlos to be Responsible and Liable for Payments
After the Modification Agreement.
Not only did plaintiff fail to counter defendants'

motions for summary judgment with the required expert testimony,
but the admitted facts show that plaintiff cannot establish that
their was a breach of the duty by the King defendants.

In this

case, plaintiff claims that the King defendants were negligent in
omitting the Logans and Wayne Carlos from liability after the
Modification Agreement.

The admitted facts show that plaintiff
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intended that Kim Carlos be the only person with continuing
responsibility and liability for payments when plaintiff signed
the Modification Agreement.

The final draft of the Modification

Agreement was signed by plaintiff and Kim Carlos in March of
1989.

The definitions in the Modification Agreement clearly

identify only Kim M. Carlos as the "Buyer."

The language of the

Modification Agreement clearly indicates that the Logans and Wayne
Carlos were not liable for future payments, and that Kim Carlos
alone would be responsible and liable for all future payments.
Plaintiff once again evidenced this intent by signing the
Verified Complaint in the foreclosure action that stated:
5. That on March 29, 1984, the plaintiffs
entered into a modification of the original Real
Estate Contract wherein they agreed to substitute
Kim Carlos as the sole buyer of the premises and
eliminate any further obligation or
responsibility of the Logans, and further
modified the terms of the payments that would be
made by the defendant Kim Carlos in the future.
6. That by the terms of the modification
agreement, Kim Carlos was to make monthly
payments of $1,435.00 beginning with the first
day of April, 1984, said payments to be received
on or before the 10th day of each month, after
which late charges would be assessed.
7. That the documents of title were being
held in escrow and all payments were to be paid
through escrow.
8. That the defendant Kim Carlos has
repeatedly been delinquent in her monthly
payments and repeated demand letters have been
made to the escrow agent.
9. That the defendant Kim Carlos failed to
make the June, 1986 payment and after the
appropriate demand letter was submitted to her,
-15-

all documents of title have been returned to the
plaintiffs.
10. That the defendant Kim Carlos has also
failed to pay the real property taxes as required
by the Real Estate Contract for the 1983, 1984
and 1985 calendar years.
(R. at pp. 116-17).

The Verified Complaint contains no allegations

that the Logans or Wayne Carlos were in default and liable for
payments.

Based on this evidence, it is proper to conclude that

plaintiff failed to create a factual issue concerning breach of
the standard of care by the King defendants, and thus affirm the
district court's entry of judgment in favor of the King defendants.
2.

The Admitted Facts Show that the King Defendants' Alleged
Negligence Was Not the Proximate Cause of Damage to
Plaintiff.
The admitted facts show that at the time of the

foreclosure sale, plaintiff was owed $60,497.35 as a result of Kim
Carlos' breach of the Modification Agreement.

The admitted facts

also show that at the foreclosure sale, plaintiff bid $67,975.61,
which sum included the total judgment plus interest.

Under Utah

law, plaintiff was not entitled to recover any amount from Kim
Carlos in excess of the judgment amount.

By bidding a sum equal

to or greater than the judgment amount at the foreclosure sale,
plaintiff was not entitled to seek any amount as a deficiency from
Kim Carlos.

Utah Code Ann. S 57-1-32. This would have also been

true as to the Logans and Wayne Carlos if they had also been
liable for payments after the Modification Agreement.
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Accordingly, because the omission of the Logans and Wayne Carlos
from liability after the Modification Agreement was not the
proximate cause of any damage to plaintiff, judgment in favor of
the King defendants must be affirmed.
CONCLUSION
This Court does not have jurisdiction to review the
judgment entered in favor of the King defendants because
plaintiffs Amended Notice of Appeal does not appeal that judgment.
Plaintiff failed to produce any evidence in opposition to
defendants* motions for summary judgment.

Plaintiffs failure to

do so prevents her from seeking to create factual issues for the
first time on appeal.

By failing to oppose defendants' motions

for summary judgment, plaintiff failed to produce evidence
sufficient to make a showing as to the essential elements of her
claim for legal malpractice.

Plaintiffs failure to make such a

showing entitles defendants to judgment.

In addition, the

admitted facts establish that the King defendants are entitled to
judgment.

Accordingly, this Court should affirm judgment of the

district court entered in favor of the King defendants.
DATED this 3 / S"f~~ day of August, 1989.
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER

Thomas L. KayC/
Paul D. Newman
Attorneys for Defendants
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on the

3/sfday of August, 1989,

four (4) true and correct copies of BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS FELSHAW
KING AND KING & KING were mailed by first-class mail, postage
prepaid, to the following:
Carman E, Kipp
Shawn McGarry
KIPP & CHRISTIAN, P.C.
City Centre 1, #330
175 East 400 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2314
Attorneys for Brian R. Florence,
Florence & Hutchison and
John Blair Hutchison
Helen Coleman
261 Marilyn Drive
Clearfield, Utah 84015
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